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Article 4

Prescott: Responses to the Five Questions

RESPONSES TO THE FIVE QUESTIONS:
FIRST QUESTION
Jody M. Prescottt
TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11, WHAT IS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT LEGACY
LEFT BY THE TERRORIST ATTACKS? ARE WE SAFER?

1.

I. Introduction
From a national security and military perspective, perhaps the
most significant legacy of the terrorist attacks ten years ago is not
the wars that followed the attacks, nor is it the rapid evolution of
military and paramilitary tactics and technology in response to
dealing with a resilient and adaptive set of adversaries during the
course of these wars. I suggest instead that the most important
effect is the change that has occurred in the way the United States'
national security and military organizations have begun to think
holistically about the future use of force in complex environments.
The counterinsurgency strategy that proved useful in Iraq has not
achieved the same degree of success in Afghanistan, but its
formulation and application mark an important milestone in the
evolution of the United States' thinking about the use of different
forms of influence, and about the ripple effects of both kinetic and
non-kinetic actions in a theatre of operations fought amongst the
people.' Recently, the Obama Administration has taken further
steps in the implementation of such an approach with the United
States' participation in the NATO campaign to assist the former
rebels in Libya and the dispatch of special forces troops to assist
African forces in executing the International Criminal Court's
arrest warrant for Joseph Kony of the Lord's Resistance Army.
Further, at the strategic level, the Department of Defense began
t Non-resident senior fellow, West Point Center for the Rule of Law. This
article represents neither the official position of the United States Military
Academy nor the United States Army. I wish to thank Major John Dehn for his
invaluable assistance in reviewing this manuscript.
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planning for possible future military actions congruent with the
developed
concept
Operations
Mass Atrocity Response
collaboratively by the Carr Center for Human Rights, Harvard's
Kennedy School, and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability
2
Operations Institute.
These are important examples, but where does one find the
lessons learned and taken to heart, and the resulting principles that
guide the thinking on how to approach future operations in these
sorts of environments? Although it is ordinarily imprudent to base
an analysis of an evolving national approach to working within the
international security environment upon a small sample of high
level policy documents, an assessment of the Obama
Administration's recently released International Strategy for
Cyberspace, and the unclassified version of the Department of
Defense's (hereinafter referred to as "DoD") Strategy for Operatingin
Cyberspace, may in fact provide a snapshot of what the United States
believes it has learned since 9/11. It also provides a snapshot of
how the United States intends to apply this awareness in a crucial
and complex operational area characterized by rapidly evolving
technology, shadowy and amorphous actors, and uncertain legal
and policy norms.
II.

InternationalStrategyfor Cyberspace

Because of the way InternationalStrategy is structured, analysis
of it-even for the purpose of seeking to identify overarching
principles-must focus in large part upon content and, therefore,
tends to be descriptive. First, as to the end state the United States
desires to achieve through international action, the strategy
envisions:
secure, and reliable
[A]n open, interoperable,
information and communications infrastructure that
2. See generally SARAH SEWALL, DWIGHT RAYMOND, & SALLY CHIN, MASS
ATROcITY RESPONSE OPERATIONS: A MILITARY PLANNING HANDBOOK (2010)
(highlighting various attributes of the Mass Atrocity Response Operations
(MARO) Project), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/maro/pdf
/MARO Handbook_4.30.pdf.
3. THE WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE (2011),
availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss-viewer
/internationalstrategy-forscyberspace.pdf[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY].
4.
DEP'T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN
CYBERSPACE (2011), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/d2010714cyber

.pdf [hereinafter DoD

STRATEGY].
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supports international trade and commerce, strengthens
international security, and fosters free expression and
innovation. To achieve that goal, we will build and sustain
an environment in which norms of responsible behavior
guide states' actions, sustain partnerships, and support the
rule of law in cyberspace.
To

achieve

this

goal,

International Strategy

sets

out

complementary diplomatic, development, and defense objectives.
In terms of diplomacy, the United States intends to build consensus
among states which favor "an open, interoperable, secure, and
reliable cyberspace," and that will "work together and act as
responsible stakeholders."' This consensus would be furthered
through

achievement

of

International Strategy's development

objective, which is to promote the building of cyber security
capacity internationally, thereby strengthening global networks
through the enhanced protection of different national digital
infrastructures.
The accomplishment of the defense objective is likely to prove
the most challenging in developing consensus as to the applicable
legal norms, because the use of force in cyberspace is particularly
controversial. In describing the defense objective, International
Strategy notes that the United States "will defend its networks,
whether the threat comes from terrorists, cybercriminals, or states
and their proxies.... [using] a range of credible response
options."" The purpose of such actions is to, "along with other
nations, encourage responsible behavior and oppose those who
would seek to disrupt networks and systems, dissuading and
deterring malicious actors, and reserving the right to defend these
vital national assets as necessary and appropriate."9 The defense
objective relies heavily on dissuading malicious actors from
committing unfriendly acts, and International Strategy phrases this

aspect of the objective in positive terms, as it emphasizes the
fostering of a robust cyber defense capacity both in the United
States and abroad. The deterrence aspect, however, is described
much more plainly. In conducting deterrence operations, the
United States states that it "will ensure that the risks associated with

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY,

supra note 3, at 8.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 11-12, 14-15.
Id. at 12.
Id.
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attacking or exploiting our networks vastly outweigh the potential
International Strategy recognizes "that cyberspace
benefits." 0
activities can have effects extending beyond networks; such events
may require responses in self-defense."" It further notes:
When warranted, the United States will respond to hostile
acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our
country.... [A]nd we recognize that certain hostile acts
conducted through cyberspace could compel actions
under the commitments we have with our military treaty
partners. We reserve the right to use all necessary
means ... as appropriate and consistent with applicable
our Nation, our
international law, in order to defend
12
allies, our partners, and our interests.
In seeking to achieve these objectives, InternationalStrategy sets
out three basic principles that will guide the United States in
working to this end state: fundamental freedoms, privacy, and the
free flow of information. Fundamental freedoms are described as
"the ability to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any medium" as an internationally recognized civil
liberty.' 4 "Privacy" is defined in terms of a balance to be struck
between individuals' expectations as to the fair use and protection
of their personal data, and the need to prevent criminal activity
against personal information through regulated law enforcement
actions. InternationalStrategy defines the principle of "free flow of
information" as the fostering of an information-exchange
environment, which is "a level playing field that rewards
innovation, entrepreneurship, and industriousness, not a venue
where states arbitrarily disrupt the free flow of information to
create unfair advantage."'
This end state will be both promoted and undergirded by the
norms that result from the United States' "work with like-minded
states to establish an environment of expectations ... that ground
and guide international
policies
and defense
foreign
partnerships."" This is important to the United States because of
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss5/4

4

Prescott: Responses to the Five Questions

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

1540

[Vol. 38:5

the uncertainty that has developed as governments "seeking to
exercise traditional national power through cyberspace" find
themselves doing so without "clearly agreed-upon norms for
acceptable state behavior in cyberspace."18 In addressing this gap,
the United States' position is that the "[1]ong-standing
international norms guiding state behavior-in times of peace and
conflict-also apply in cyberspace," but that the "unique attributes
of networked technology require additional work to clarify how
these norms apply and what additional understandings might be
necessary to supplement them." 9 Addressing this uncertainty,
therefore, will require reaching "a consensus on what constitutes
acceptable behavior, and a partnership among those who view the
functioning of these systems as essential to the national and
collective interest.,,2
The United States does not believe that
reaching this consensus requires either "a reinvention of customary
international law" or rendering "existing international norms
obsolete," but instead sees these as a basis upon which to build
21
consensus.
Expanding upon the three basic principles that would guide
the United States in its strategic approach to achieving the end
state, InternationalStrategy identifies the five basic principles that
will undergird these norms as "Upholding Fundamental
Freedoms," "Respect for Property," "Valuing Privacy," "Protection
from Crime," and, perhaps most importantly for this article, the
"Right of Self-Defense."22
International Strategy posits that
"[c]onsistent with the United Nations Charter, states have an
inherent right to self-defense that may be triggered by certain
aggressive acts in cyberspace."
Interestingly, InternationalStrategy
also identifies five emerging norms seen as essential to the proper
use of cyberspace: "Global Interoperability," which is a functioning
internet to which all would have access;2 "Network Stability," which
would prevent states from "arbitrarily [interfering] with
internationally interconnected infrastructure;"25 "Reliable Access,"
such that states would not arbitrarily interfere with individuals
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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accessing the internet; "Multi-stakeholder Governance," meaning
the inclusion of non-state actors;
and "Cybersecurity Due
Diligence," defined as the obligations of states to protect their
"information infrastructures and secure national systems from
damage or misuse.

,,281

Although the third section of International Strategy, entitled
"Policy Priorities," is largely reiterative, it states with greater
specificity the strategic necessity of sustaining technological
innovation, protecting intellectual property, and improving the

security of the high-tech supply chain to better promote efforts to
combat cybercrime, to enhance multiple stakeholder governance,
to protect civil liberties, and to develop agreed-upon norms of
The information contained in this
cyberspace behavior. 9
prioritization is helpful because it potentially sets out a checklist
that United States negotiators might consult to determine if
negotiating partners were, at least from the perspective of the
United States, sufficiently "like-minded." Judging by the provisions
of the G-8 joint declaration issued at the conclusion of the May
2011 Deauville Summit, which dealt with the internet, there is
apparently great agreement among the NATO allies, Japan, and
Russia on the principles and goals of internet use and
governance-at least with regard to diplomacy and development.
Must a partner state agree on all three of the United States'
objectives, or is it sufficient to find common ground on two, or
perhaps just one ground, to be included in the coalition of similar
thinking? This question is likely to be of great significance in
determining how the United States approaches work in cyberspace
with China and India.
III. DoD Strategy for Operatingin Cyberspace
The unclassified version of the subsequent DoD Strategy,
released two months after the Administration's strategy, was
criticized by a number of commentators for failing to explicitly

Id.
Id.
Id.
29. Id. at 17-24.
30. See Renewed Commitment for Freedom and Democracy, G-8 FRANCE 2011,
http://www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/g8/english/live/news/renewed-commitment-forfreedom-and-democracy.1314.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2012) (describing G-8's
commitment to Internet use and governance).
26.
27.
28.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss5/4

6

Prescott: Responses to the Five Questions

1542

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:5

explain the standards, which would guide the use of force by the
United States in response to a cyber attack." The U.S. Senate
Committee on Armed Services quickly reminded the Secretary of
Defense that DoD had agreed to provide a report to the committee
by December 2010 that addressed "a number of critical
questions ...
including the relationship between military
operations in cyberspace and kinetic operations; ... the rules of
engagement for commanders; the definition of what would
constitute an act of war in cyberspace; and what constitutes the use
of force for the purpose of complying with the War Powers Act."32
Rather than focusing on the use of force, however, DoD Strategy
instead sets out five complementary strategic initiatives that
emphasize the importance of creating a well-organized, trained,
and equipped cyber force structure.
In essence, these initiatives
all work towards two main lines of strategic effort: creating
partnerships with civilian governmental agencies, private industry,
allies, and other international partners and developing a national
wellspring of talent and innovation to keep the United States
military and industry competitive in the cyber arena.34 DoD Strategy
does note the use of "active cyber defense" as an operating concept,
but defines it in a facially benign manner as the "synchronized,
real-time capability to discover, detect, analyze and mitigate threats
and vulnerabilities. 3 5 This definition is not completely consistent
with statements made by certain U.S. officials, which indicated that
this concept also entailed operations within other states' digital

31. See, e.g., Sean Lawson, DOD's "First" Cyber Strategy is Neither First, Nor a
Strategy, FoRBES.COM (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/seanlawson
/2011/08/01 /dods-first-cyber-strategy-is-neither-first-nor-a-strategy/; Jared Serbu,
DOD Strategy Aims At Deterrence, FEDERALNEWSRADIO.COM (uly 15, 2011),
http://www.federalnewsradio.com/?nid=697&sid=2457989.
32. Letter from John McCain, Ranking Member, U.S. Senate Comm. on
Armed Servs., & Carl Levin, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on Armed Servs., to
Leon Panetta, Sec'y of Def. (July 20, 2011), availableat http://mccain.senate.gov
/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStoreid=40ca96ab-ec9e-4662-a360Ocl806e44f4e. The authors must have meant the War Powers Resolution, which
requires that the President inform Congress within forty-eight hours if U.S. forces
are engaged in combat, and that Congress authorizes continued military
engagement in excess of sixty days. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (2006); WilliamJ. Lynn,
III, Deputy Sec'y of Def., Remarks on the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy,
address at the National Defense University (July 14, 2011) [hereinafter Lynn
Remarks].
33. DoD STRATEGY, supra note 4, at 5-10.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 7.
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36

infrastructure.
Such operations could conceivably violate longstanding legal and policy norms regarding neutrality and would
raise additional questions as to the use of force threshold that
would need to be met for a state to react to a cyber attack in selfdefense.
To have a better idea of what the classified version of DoD
Strategy contains regarding the use of force, it is perhaps useful to
consider DoD Strategy in the context of the official statements made
at the time of its launching. In remarks made at the formal
announcement of DoD Strategy at the National Defense University in
July 2011, Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn first noted
the wide breadth of the threat spectrum, ranging from developed
and responsible state actors possessing sophisticated cyber
capabilities at one end, to opportunistic criminal actors and "rogue
states" at the other.3 ' Deputy Secretary Lynn observed that,
although deterrence might have effectively discouraged major state
actors from undertaking destructive cyber measures against the
United States, terrorists and rogue states, which had "few or no
assets to hold at risk," were not as likely to be dissuaded from
conducting such operations by the same response measures.
Deputy Secretary Lynn provided a snapshot of the current situation
in cyberspace, describing it as evidencing a temporary imbalance in
capability and intent between the different possible actors.39 Those
actors with sophisticated capabilities were developing even "[m] ore
40
destructive tools" but were not likely to use them in the near term.
Actors with the greatest intent to inflict harm were without such
capabilities but would acquire them in time.4
Although he believed that in the future we are likely "to see
destructive or disruptive cyber attacks that could have an impact
analogous to physical hostilities," Deputy Secretary Lynn noted that
"the vast majority of malicious cyber activity today does not cross
this threshold."4 '
Deputy Secretary Lynn's use of the word
"analogous" to describe the relationship between war-like acts in
36. Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon ConsidersPreemptive Sthikes as Part of Cyber-Defense
Strategy, WASH. Posr Aug. 28, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/08/28/AR201 0082803849 pf.html.
37. Lynn Remarks, supra note 32.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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the geophysical world and serious unfriendly acts in cyberspace
suggests that, in the classified version of DoD Strategy, DoD has not
directly incorporated international humanitarian law concepts and
applications governing the use of force. Earlier statements by DoD
officials had suggested that the new DoD strategy would rely on a
concept of "equivalence" between geophysical world conflict and
cyber action to guide its use of force in cyberspace, 4 and, on the
spectrum of similarity with "identical" at one end and "completely
different" on the other, equivalence might likely be closer to
identity than analogy. If so, this could have profound impacts
upon the application of international humanitarian law in
cyberspace.
In reemphasizing the holistic nature of DoD Strategy, however,
Deputy Secretary Lynn pointed out that, although the United
States reserved "the right, under the laws of armed conflict, to
respond to serious cyber attacks with a proportional and justified
military response at the time and place" of its choosing, DoD Strategy
focused upon defensive and confidence-building measures, which
would be constructed and applied through partnerships with
44
civilian government agencies, industry, and international allies.
Deputy Secretary Lynn's earlier description of active cyber defense,
however, suggests that the language in the classified version of DoD
Strategy might be more aggressive than that provided to the public
in the unclassified version.
IV. Possible Lessons Learned
With these issues in mind, assessment of the cyber strategies
suggests nine main points that evidence the overarching principles
the United States appears to have decided to apply to the use of
force since 9/11.
1. Terrorism Is a Significant Threat but Not the Organizing Theme of
International Strategy
InternationalStrategy is not focused upon terrorism: in reading
the text, one sees that the word "terrorists" appears on only
two separate pages,4 and the words "non-state actors" occur

43. Siobhan Gorman & Julian E. Barnes, Cyber Combat: Act of War, WALL ST.J.,
May 31, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230456310457635
5623135782718.html.
44. Lynn Remarks, supra note 32.
45. See INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY, supranote 3, at 12, 20.
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2.

3.

4.

5.

only twice in the document. Cyber terrorism is instead just
one aspect of an operational environment, and the strategy
shows flexibility in using either law enforcement or military
means, or both, to engage it. The DoD Strategy discusses
terrorism more often, but it still is not the most significant
aspect of the strategy.
Holism Is Essential in a Complex World
Both strategies are cast in largely positive terms in creating a
holistic perspective, and they emphasize the very influential
civil liberties aspect of cyberspace use and the far-reaching
economic significance of connectivity. The important role
played by social media in the uprisings in different Arab
countries in the early part of 2011 provides a credible
empirical basis for concluding that this holistic approach is not
just fluff and that soft power is just as real a power as military
47
strength.
Networks UnderstandNetworks
The holistic approaches of both strategies also show that the
United States appreciates that a networked approach to
dealing with a network, whether it is al Qaeda as a geophysical
world threat or a threat on the Internet itself, is likely to be the
most fruitful course of action in disarming it.
Collective Security OrganizationsRemain Relevant
In specifically noting that certain aggressive actions in
cyberspace against the United States or its allies could trigger
self-defense responses pursuant to collective self-defense
treaties, the United States recognizes the enduring value of
formal multilateral organizations such as NATO in dealing
with non-traditional threats. Formal organizations are better
suited to creating standing processes to deal with emerging
international threats, as NATO has done with its Cyber
Defence Management Board.
Rule of Law Is Essentialto Democracies Succeeding
Just as the United States has come to appreciate the
complementary relationship between security and the rule of
law in the geophysical operational environment of

46. See id. at 13, 21.
47. See China Calls U.S. Culprit in Global 'Internet War,' ABCNEWS.COM (une
2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=13750409.
48. NATO and Cyber Defence, N. ATLANTIC TREATY ORG., http://www.nato.int
/cps/en/natolive/topics_78170.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2012).
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7.
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Afghanistan, 9 InternationalStrategy makes the same connection
in cyberspace.
Civilian and Military Organizations Must Cooperate to Be Most
Effective
Given the Internet's ubiquity, InternationalStrategy recognizes
the important complementary relationships between civilian
and military agencies in countries in terms of dealing with
cyber threats. In practice, this is demonstrated by the recent
memorandum of agreement between the DoD and the
Department of Homeland Security setting out the terms of
their cooperative efforts in cyberspace security.o
ProtectingGlobal Assets Requires Global Partnering
In terms of working internationally, International Strategy
recognizes the need for greater global inclusiveness, notjust in
terms of building cyber security capacity in other countries but
also in terms of setting the norms according to which that
security will be executed, by expanding "this work to
geographic regions currently underrepresented in the
dialogue-most notably Africa and the Middle East-to
further our interest in building worldwide capacity."
Non-State Actors Can Play an ImportantRole in Governance
Although InternationalStrategy emphasizes the role of states in
bringing about cyber security, it does recognize that
governments and industry are not the only actors with a stake
in the governance of cyberspace. It views the participation of
regional organizations, civil society, and academia as being
likewise important in shaping the norms by which the Internet
52
should be governed.
Development of New Legal and Policy Norms Requires Consensus
Finally, and most importantly for purposes of this article, the
United States would appear to have concluded that, if it is
seeking to have a role in defining the application of
international law and security policy in an area which is
unsettled or which does not conform completely to existing

49. Sebastian Rietjens et al., Measuring the Immeasurable? The Effects-Based
Approach in Comprehensive Peace Operations, 34 INT'L J. PUB. ADMIN. 329, 332-34
(2011).
50. Cheryl Pellerin, DOD, DHS join Forces to Promote Cybersecurity, U.S.
DEPARTMENT DEF. NEWS (Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.defense.gov/news
/newsarticle.aspx?id=61264.
51. INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY, supranote 3, at 18.
52. Id. at 12.
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understandings and applications, this is best done by building
consensus rather than striking out on a new path unilaterally,
as the Bush Administration did in the period immediately after
9/11 with regard, for example, to the treatment of detainees
The
in a non-traditional, transnational armed conflict."
coalitions
upon
reliance
significant
place
strategies
cyberspace
of the like-minded to serve as the nuclei for developing
consensus on the norms of cyber behavior expected of
responsible actors. This is different than a "coalition of the
willing," as exemplified by various international partners
supporting the United States invasion of Iraq. A coalition of
the like-minded is based on similar values, produces policies
based on those values, and presents more than a subtle shift in
how the United States will approach its relationships with
other states in this important area.
V

An UnintendedLegacy?

Determining which lessons a country's leadership should learn
from its experiences in dealing with a complex, violent, and
adaptive adversary is difficult enough; determining the real lessons
it has digested and begun to implement through the promulgation
of policy and doctrine is even harder. This analysis is further
complicated when the government's positions and guidance are
pitched at the strategic level and are designed potentially both to
educate friendly actors as to how it intends to plan, train for, and
conduct its operations and to inform potentially unfriendly actors
where redlines, or thresholds, might exist regarding their behavior
towards that government and its interests, and its range of possible
responses. Different government agencies will likely have different
perspectives on the same event, and staffing processes within
of parent agency
mindful
separate bureaucracies-ever
priorities-might not lead to objective and consistent assessment of
what is truly worth learning and applying. These two strategies may
be decent candidates for staking out exceptions to this rule,
however. Both appear to have been built in a holistic fashion,
concerning an area internationally recognized as being of crucial
importance, with the benefit of a decade's worth of successful and
53. Letter from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President 6 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/doj/bybee8102ltr.html.
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unsuccessful experiences on similar and related issues. On this
basis, the cyberspace strategies are not just policy pronouncements;
they are likely complementary statements of underlying values and
practical priorities reflected across the breadth of an
Administration's engagement on the topic. If this is indeed a
legacy of 9/11, even if an unintended diploma after an expensive
and often painful tuition, the question remains whether the United
States will be safer from terrorist attacks because it will conduct its
foreign affairs and military operations in conformance with this
approach.
Holistic strategies particularly require holistic
assessment, and holistic assessment is neither inexpensive nor
simple. It requires a significant amount of time to register actual
effects as compared to trends . How successful the United States is
at achieving its specific cyber goals, however, possibly could serve as
a touchstone of the efficacy of this approach.

54. See Rietjens et al., supra note 49, at 335-37 (addressing challenges in
accurately conducting holistic analysis in complex environments).
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